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European Defence: A Post-American Future?

James Adkins | Europe and Eurasia Fellow

NATO Meeting in Washington D.C. (July 2024). Image sourced from the White House via Wikimedia Commons.


From 9–11 July 2024, leaders from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) gathered in Washington, D.C. for a summit to mark the alliance’s 75th anniversary. Despite the milestone, the atmosphere was far from triumphant, with Russia’s war against Ukraine and uncertainty over the outcome of the United States (US) Presidential Election the foremost concerns of attendees. With the risk of future American disengagement from Europe, countries across the continent must urgently invest in their defence capabilities to provide for their own security.


Europe’s ‘holiday from history’


After the fall of the Berlin Wall and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the so-called ‘end of history’ was supposed to herald a new dawn of peace across Europe. Western European countries reaped the rewards of a ‘peace dividend’, cutting defence spending and ending Cold War-era conscription schemes. By contrast, Eastern European countries, such as Poland and the Baltics – who had experienced Russian imperialism firsthand – feared future Russian aggression and rapidly sought security under NATO membership to preserve their newly regained sovereignty.


Whilst there were countless warning signs of Russia’s return to imperialism – such as its invasion of Georgia in 2008 – the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a critical juncture which clearly demonstrated Vladimir Putin’s revanchist ambitions. This should have been a moment for European governments to wake up to the threat posed by Russia, arm Ukraine and invest in their defence capabilities.


Yet, aside from limited sanctions packages, European countries acted as if nothing had changed. Despite repeated promises to raise national defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP, only a handful of members had done so by the time Russia had invaded Ukraine in 2022. Prior to the war, Germany had even doubled down on its dependency on Russian energy by pursuing the ill-fated Nordstream 2 gas-pipeline in the face of strong American opposition. This inaction sent a message to Putin that Russian aggression would not generate a meaningful European response.


NATO: from ‘brain-dead’ to re-energised


Europe’s security delusion was instantly shattered when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Putin’s war precipitated an immediate transformation in Germany’s security policy, with Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaiming a ‘Zeitenwende’, or historic turning point, with massive investment in Germany’s defence capabilities. NATO members coordinated to deliver arms to Ukraine, stepped up their promises to meet the 2 per cent target, and Sweden and Finland joined the alliance.

The silver lining of the war in Ukraine has thus been in re-energising an alliance which French President Emmauel Macron in 2019 declared ‘braindead’. However, it has also plainly exposed the severe dependency of European nations on the US, with American financial and military support delivered to Ukraine worth nearly as much as that from all European countries combined.


The Trump card


Almost three years on from Russia’s invasion, Europe faces the risk of US disengagement from NATO and Ukraine should Donald Trump return to the White House. A second Trump administration would likely be far more damaging to the transatlantic alliance than the first, with Trump threatening to cut US aid for Ukraine and promising to make a peace deal with Putin. Trump has even questioned the US’ commitment to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence guarantee and encouraged Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to NATO members that don’t spend enough on defence, raising fears that Putin may be emboldened to attack vulnerable former Soviet states, such as the Baltic countries.


Amid this uncertainty, former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte has been formally confirmed as the next Secretary General of the alliance, replacing Jens Stoltenberg. As one of Europe’s longest serving leaders, Rutte’s diplomatic experience will be particularly valuable for maintaining unity between the 32 NATO members. Rutte was selected in part because he is seen as well-placed to manage the possible return of Trump to the White House, having been dubbed the ‘Trump Whisperer’ for his deft defusal of a dispute at a 2018 NATO summit in Brussels.


The European Union’s geopolitical awakening


The spectre of Trump’s return serves as a wake-up call for Europeans that the strong American commitment to European security under the Biden administration cannot be taken for granted. Trump is not the only factor behind the US’ shift away from Europe, with the growing need for a pivot towards great power competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. There are indications that Europe has begun to adjust to this new geopolitical reality, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlining a vision for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and announcing the creation of an EU Defence Commissioner to oversee defence industry production.


In February 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron triggered debate by refusing to rule out sending troops to Ukraine, and in April called for Europe to “break out from … strategic guardianship” and embrace “strategic autonomy” in a major speech at Sorbonne University. Whilst other EU leaders, such as German Chancellor Scholz, have been more hesitant to embrace such strong rhetoric, Trump’s re-emergence has largely vindicated advocates of greater European strategic autonomy such as Macron.


Towards European defence sovereignty


Amid the return of major war in Europe for the first time since 1945, the risk of a Trump presidency, and the US’ strategic shift towards the Indo-Pacific, Europe must prepare for a future without the American security guarantee. While at this stage a full US withdrawal from NATO is unlikely, regardless of who wins the White House in November, Europe must invest in its defence capabilities to reduce its security dependency on the US and build ‘European sovereignty’ in defence.



James Adkins is the Europe and Eurasia Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. He recently completed a Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Modern Languages majoring in Political Science and International Relations, French Studies, and German Studies at the University of Western Australia.


During his fellowship, James looks forward to exploring contemporary geopolitical developments shaping Europe and the wider Eurasian region, including their implications for Australia and our region, the Indo-Pacific.

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