From Kyiv to Canberra: Why Drones Must Anchor Australia’s Strategy of Denial

Thomas Grant

Image sourced from АрміяІнформ via Wikimedia Commons.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the characteristics of warfare have undergone a major shift. From expensive and advanced jets or missile defence systems, the battlefield is now shaped by cheap, expendable drones. These drones, often costing as little as AUD$850 (USD$500), have transformed combat through mass, adaptability and lethality. In 2025, 10,000 of these drones were estimated to be being used every day across eastern Ukrainian battlefields. The wider implications of this technological shift must be assessed in its relation to Australia’s military capabilities. This article will argue that Australia’s strategy of denial should prioritise increased investment in cheap, mass produced drones, particularly in Indo-Pacific scenarios where a middle power must offset the advantages of a larger military, such as China’s. The war in Ukraine provides the clearest demonstration as to why.

Drone Warfare Transformation

Early on during the conflict, Ukraine opted for clunkier larger style drones, much like the ones primarily used by the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Slowly, Russian air superiority rendered them extremely vulnerable to being shot down and the Ukrainians turned their attention elsewhere. As a result, they instead turned to cheaper, commercial style drones, rushed into the battlefield, and quickly kitted out to be fit for war. In June 2025, Ukraine launched what is one of the most sophisticated drone operations the world has ever seen, Operation Spiderweb. The operation is estimated to have cost Russia almost AUD$10 billion (USD$7 billion) in damages and repairs. At the forefront of this attack were 117 first person view (FPV) drones, which targeted multiple Russian airfields and damaged Russia’s fleet of bomber planes and surveillance aircraft.

The ADF’s Strategy of Denial rests on convincing adversaries that military action in relation to Australia would prove prohibitively costly. Operation Spiderweb is proof that drones can and must anchor this strategy. Specifically in deterring coercion and potential military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, Ukrainian drone operations signify a disproportionate level of financial military damage. For Australia, this suggests that mass produced drones could play a central role in deterrence, particularly in conflicts where Australia must counter a numerically and technologically superior adversary.

Quantity as a quality

The defining feature of this military shift is the scale in which weaponry is being deployed. Both Russia and Ukraine are increasingly focused on attritable systems deployed in mass over limited number deployment of sophisticated weaponry. Drones now even make up 75% of combat losses, referring to the death, injury or disappearance of soldiers as well as equipment destruction, on both sides of the conflict. The war allows a glimpse into a new era of security and conflict policy; the idea that quantity itself is a true indicator of quality. Drones are providing infantry with more intelligence, improving the pace and precision of artillery strikes and ultimately enhancing battlefield lethality. 

More recently, the United States of America approached Ukraine for advice on countering Iranian drones in the Gulf, further proof that even the biggest military superpower on the planet is affected by these small scale drone deployments. Beyond their ability to impose strategic costs, Ukrainian drone warfare demonstrates that these systems are effective combat assets in their own right. For Australia, this suggests that in the event the strategy of denial were to fail, these drones could still greatly support the ADF with a credible capability to defend its territory and military assets. 

Lessons for Australia

As a middle power in global military strength, Australia faces strategic conditions similar to those shaping Ukraine’s battlefield experience. Australia cannot rely solely on a handful of large scale investments into defence technologies. Notably, the recent AUKUS submarine deal which arms Australia with eight nuclear powered submarines will cost Australia up to AUD$368 billion over the course of the deal, making it the largest defence expenditure in Australian history. These capabilities remain important but Ukraine suggests a far more cost effective way to impose not only military damages on opposing forces but to act as an effective deterrent. 

To effectively implement drones both as serious defence capable weapons as well as assets central to its denial strategy, there must be a shift in aversion policy and risk tolerance surrounding them, and more specifically, losing them. The ADF must attain the idea that drones are no longer pieces of technology often framed as having near limitless battlefield applications. They are ammunition. A change in aversion policy surrounding military equipment, positions our strategic policy in indicating a willingness to lose drones in the masses to wear down enemy military assets. To accurately portray this deterrence posture, this shift in policy is just as important as the drones themselves.

A Strategy of Denial

The ADF’s strategy of denial is based on convincing potential adversaries that military objectives against Australia would be prohibitively costly. Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that cheap, expendable drones can impose significant military costs and reshape the application of force. By integrating attritable drones into its force structure, Australia can strengthen Indo-Pacific deterrence and reinforce its strategy of denial without needing to match larger powers in traditional defence spending. If Australia’s strategy is to make conflict prohibitively expensive, then Ukraine is the proof that drones are the currency of modern deterrence.

Thomas Grant is a first year Political Science and International Relations student at Griffith University, majoring in Security, Conflict, and Human Rights with a double major in Mandarin. He is particularly interested in security, intelligence, and the development of modern warfare.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Young Australians in International Affairs.