La Mano Dura: Trading Democracy for the Illusion of Security

Federico Canas Velasco | Latin America Fellow

Image sourced from ArodriguezUS via Wikimedia Commons.

From El Salvador jamming tens of thousands of citizens into mega-prisons, to Ecuador’s patrol of the streets under an “internal armed conflict” decree, the Mano Dura or “iron fist” approach has emerged as Latin America’s fastest-growing political export. Faced with soaring crime, mass migration, and systemic corruption, voters are overwhelmingly endorsing leaders who promise instant, uncompromising order through militarised crackdowns and the suspension of civil liberties, often cheering as constitutional checks are dismantled. Even self-proclaimed libertarians like Argentina’s Javier Milei are employing aggressive anti-protest protocols to demonstrate unyielding state control. 

This regional pattern signals that the political reward of perceived security now vastly outweighs the historic risk of state authoritarianism. La Mano Dura is not a genuine security measure, but a highly successful political spectacle. This dangerous tool is being employed by a new generation of leaders to trade democratic stability for the illusion of order. 

The Modern Caudillos

The explosive regional popularity of La Mano Dura is born from profound social exhaustion. With the region suffering over “one-third of global homicides,” alongside decades of corruption and ineffective courts, citizens feel abandoned by traditional, slow-moving democracies. They crave swift justice and the feeling of order.

This emotional demand is the political fuel driving the success of leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. Having won a second term despite a constitutional ban, Bukele taps into a deep regional history by embodying the caudillo, the strongman dictator of 19th-century Latin America who traditionally ruled above the law through charisma and military force. He leverages his social media platforms to broadcast propaganda that presents himself and his hard-line approach as “the solution to the country’s violence.”

Such messaging delivers a classic populist narrative, pitting Bukele as the heroic saviour against “them,” the corrupt gangs, opposition, and failed institutions. Crucially, this populist spectacle, mirrored by similar leaders in the region, provides an illusion of security, distracting the public from the need to invest in the slow, foundational work of transparency and judicial reform.

The Authoritarian Blueprint

Bukele’s political blueprint provides the necessary cover to execute the Mano Dura’s true purpose of sabotaging the democratic state and eliminating governmental oversight. It begins with the establishment of a near-permanent “state of exception” that suspends basic rights, like the right to a legal defence, and replaces the rule of law with military control. This power is then secured politically by firing and replacing Supreme Court judges and the Attorney General with political loyalists, guaranteeing judicial complicity for mass arrests.

The capture of judicial and legislative systems enables policies to be immediately weaponised against political opponents and critics. By deliberately conflating peaceful dissent and protests with organised crime, the state uses security as a guise to suppress political rights. This is exemplified by the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders like José Ángel Pérez and Alejandro Antonio Henríquez, who were arrested and charged with aggressive resistance for peacefully protesting a mass eviction.

Concerningly, this authoritarian blueprint is being implemented across the region. In Ecuador, Noboa’s declaration of an “internal armed conflict” was quickly followed by new laws like the National Solidarity Law, which grants the president sweeping authority to pardon security forces under investigation for crimes committed during the gang crackdown. Similarly, Argentina’s aggressive anti-protest protocols strategically conflate labour movements and social problems with criminal activity. For example, Milei’s government passed a decree intended to criminalise “union activism, protest and industrial action,” thereby targeting the rights of workers. 

These governments are consciously prioritising swift, political retribution over due process, ensuring that any short-term security gains come at the expense of the rule of law. Until the region demands a return to independent judicial systems and rejects the political weaponisation of security, this blueprint will only result in long-term instability.

The Failure of La Mano Dura

While these iron-fisted policies drive political popularity and temporary drops in homicides, success is often shallow, as it stems from political spectacles or deals with gangs rather than from genuine security fixes. The long-term costs can also be devastating. Mass incarceration, for instance, has transformed Latin American prisons into criminal hubs where powerful groups are born and operate, including Brazil’s notorious Comando Vermelho gang. Moreover, the widespread mass arrests in El Salvador have left 40,000 children without parents, with families unsure as to when their relatives will be released. By deliberately ignoring the root causes of instability, such as deep corruption, weak justice systems, and high inequality, Mano Dura policies guarantee the need for future, more brutal crackdowns. Ultimately, Latin America is trading long-term democratic stability for a short-term illusion of order, establishing a dangerous new model of elected autocracy.

Reversing this dangerous trajectory requires a decisive shift away from the spectacle to the foundational work that Mano Dura policies are designed to bypass. First, civil society must demand transparency in security spending and actively expose the hidden costs, such as the humanitarian crisis and social fallout caused by mass arrests. Second, governments must invest resources in rebuilding the rule of law by creating genuinely independent judicial and anti-corruption systems. Third, leaders and policy makers must shift policies from militarisation to community investment, supporting lasting security through community-based social prevention, education, and professional policies reform. If Latin America continues to trade democratic institutions for the political spectacle of la Mano Dura, the region risks cementing a future defined not by order, but by a permanent, popular authoritarianism.

Federico Canas Velasco is the Latin American Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. He is completing his final year of a Bachelor of Arts and Advanced Studies in International and Global Studies at the University of Sydney, majoring in Spanish and Latin American Studies.

Born in Australia to Venezuelan parents, Federico's interest in Latin America stems from his proud heritage as well as his academic exploration of the region's cultural, political, and historical complexities. This interest was further enriched when he studied abroad at la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Federico looks forward to this Fellowship as an opportunity to combine his research interests with his personal experience to contribute meaningful analysis on Latin America's future amid shifting global dynamics.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Young Australians in International Affairs. All content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.