Reimagining the Bandung Conference 70 Years On

Damian Shahfazli | Indo Pacific Fellow

Image sourced from Chainwit via Wikimedia Commons.

70 years ago in April 1955, the Bandung Conference saw 29 newly independent Asian and African states meet, seeking solidarity, unity against colonialism, and non-alignment amid Cold War superpower rivalries, through providing an alternative ‘third way’. Today’s emerging multipolar environment, defined by the gradual decline of US hegemony, offers a renewed opportunity for this ‘third way’, where India and Indonesia have harnessed memory of the conference to commit to Global South-led diplomacy and non-alignment. Remaining faithful to Bandung’s founding principles of mutual respect and anti-imperialism is a tricky task for these states. India and Indonesia must be cautious in their alliances with other great powers, so as not to contradict their roles in Global South leadership. Moreover, by collaborating closely, they could provide an alternative pole for other Indo-Pacific states to follow suit.

The Bandung Conference and Non-Alignment

The Bandung Conference was grounded in intercontinental solidarity between newly independent Asian and African states. Participating states agreed to ten core principles—five drawn from the UN Charter and five additional norms focused on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and mutual cooperation. These were underpinned by a shared commitment to non-alignment, as most states sought to remain outside the influence of either the US or Soviet blocs. This commitment would eventually crystallize into the official Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which focused on issues such as self-determination, apartheid, and nuclear disarmament. The ambiguities of these principles give states agency to selectively reinterpret Bandung ideals of non-alignment, anti-imperialism and mutual respect to suit present-day geopolitical conditions.

Leading South-South Engagement

Indonesia

South-South cooperation is not only a historical posture, but an active self-identity that Indonesia diplomatically projects. Through a decentralised approach led by its various ministries, Indonesia delivers cooperation programs ranging from education and internships, to infrastructure and development within the agricultural and fisheries industries.

In its pursuit of greater strategic autonomy, Indonesia has sought to diversify its partnerships, through its recent accession to BRICS in January. BRICS today manifests in a loose coalition, but represents a symbolic pushback against Western-dominated international financial institutions, offering an alternative platform for emerging economies to determine standards on global governance.

India

Similarly, India has historically pursued an identity of non-alignment and anti-colonial solidarity emerging from its key role in the Bandung Conference. India’s present role focuses on bridging ties between ‘South’ and ‘North’ states through its presence in groupings like the Quad and G20, advocating for cooperation between the US, Europe and BRICS nations.

Further, India’s democratic alignment challenges China’s developmental success model in leading the Global South. Yet its capacity to project influence comparative to initiatives pursued by China remains constrained by limited financial resources. Regardless, India still advances development partnerships through technology transfers — recently supporting digital infrastructure such as its implementation of Unified Payments Interface (UPI) systems among Global South states.

These initiatives show both states’ commitments to principles of non-alignment and continued Global South leadership, albeit reinterpreted toward their present geopolitical interests.

Great Power Partners

Indonesia

Despite its strong Bandung legacy, under the incoming Prabowo administration, Indonesia’s commitment to non-alignment has shown signs of recalibration – namely,  a deepening of ties with Russia. Although Russia opposes US hegemony, its own imperial ambitions raise questions about the appropriateness of a strengthened relationship with Indonesia under the banner of Global South solidarity and Bandung memory. Aligning with actors whose own practices undermine principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and anti-imperialism established under Bandung signals a selective adoption of this diplomatic positioning.

India

India has exhibited similar multi-alignment behaviours, through working with multiple geopolitical partners of often conflicting interests. The current Modi administration recently reaffirmed its position within the Quad alliance yet simultaneously showed ambivalence toward the Russia-Ukraine war by maintaining trade and diplomatic ties with Moscow.

Faced with an increasingly binaric US-China order, India and Indonesia have adopted strategically ambiguous positions in aligning with multiple great power partners. However, true non-alignment is not realised by merely establishing multiple partnerships with alternative great powers. It lies in the proactive creation of autonomous, cooperative coalitions among Global South states themselves, true to the messaging of Bandung 70 years ago.

Room for Collaboration

Despite being the original architects of Bandung’s messaging around South-South solidarity, both India and Indonesia have yet to fully realise the untapped potential of their bilateral relationship in constructing a ‘third way’. Maritime cooperation, particularly the promoting freedom of navigation is one of many areas through which this can be realised. Both nations committed to joint maritime collaboration in the Indo-Pacific in 2018, yet no concrete action took place. This is a missed opportunity given Indonesia’s strategic control over the Malacca Strait and India’s pivotal position within the Indian Ocean.

Further, India and Indonesia could collaborate when undertaking developmental programs, particularly through implementing digital infrastructure. India’s recent UPI systems implementation to its Global South partners would complement Indonesia’s growing digital banking innovations, presenting a clear avenue for technological partnership. As two large, high-capacity states, working together to extend such systems across the Global South would exemplify South-South cooperation, reinforcing a shared leadership and commitment to Bandung’s developmental vision.

Once India and Indonesia realise strength in collaboration, they can offer a credible and principled alternative for other smaller Indo-Pacific states to follow. Pivoting to other great powers such as Russia or engaging with multiple partners under the pretence of multi-alignment does not sufficiently pave new pathways. Reviving the spirit of Bandung requires a return to its original intent in cultivating independent forms of multilateral cooperation among Global South states.

Damian Shahfazli is the Indo Pacific Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. He recently completed a Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of International Studies majoring in International Relations, Chinese Studies, and minoring in Politics at Macquarie University. Through his studies Damian had the opportunity to study abroad in Taiwan in 2023 for 6 months as a New Colombo Plan Mobility Grant recipient which drew his interest deeper into the Indo-Pacific.