The Pink Tide’s Existential Fight for a Fading Dream

Federico Canas Velasco | Latin America Fellow

Image sourced from Palácio do Planalto via Wikimedia Commons.

When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), delegations from eleven Latin American countries staged a dramatic walkout. This collective action, coupled with direct criticisms of the United States (US) military strikes in the Caribbean, was not a passive protest; it was the most explicit display yet of the Second Pink Tide's commitment to regional multilateralism, asserting their role in the emerging multipolar world order.

Latin America’s leaders are using the international stage to assert an independent global posture rooted in an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist discourse, transforming the decades-long rhetoric established during the first Pink Tide of the 2000s into definitive action. However, this assertive stance faces significant obstacles, including a rising tide of US-aligned right-wing populist governments and deep domestic challenges that pose an existential threat to the stability and survival of the very governments claiming multilateral leadership.

Following the Pink Tide’s Footsteps

Latin America’s assertive multilateralism is the culmination of a political project commenced during the First Pink Tide. This wave of leftist governments, which came to power following the failures of U.S.-backed neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus, consciously sought to establish a more multipolar framework for international relations. The project was institutionalised through organisations like the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), designed to exclude the US and Canada and advance regional autonomy. Leaders like Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Brazil’s Lula da Silva further embraced anti-imperialist principles, positioning their states within the Global South and forging partnerships with non-Western powers, such as China and Russia.

Governments of the current Second Pink Tide have turned this decades-long rhetoric into definitive action. Following Israel’s military response in Gaza to the October 7th attacks, countries like Bolivia and Colombia formally severed diplomatic ties with Israel, while Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Colombia joined South Africa's case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Colombian President Gustavo Petro further suspended bilateral free-trade agreements and banned coal exports to Israel, despite longstanding security ties. Furthermore, at UNGA 80, leaders directly confronted the US over military strikes in the Caribbean targeting alleged drug trafficking vessels. Petro denounced the strikes as extrajudicial killings, accusing Washington’s drug policy of being used to “dominate the peoples of the South,” and further halted intelligence-sharing with US security agencies.

This coordinated assertion of international justice marks a definitive moment in Latin America's campaign for a multilateral world order, setting a powerful example for other regional partners. Yet, this ambition faces immediate internal and external challenges, raising questions about the stability and viability of this regional leadership bid.

Re-opening Latin America to the US

The unified multilateral front claimed by the Pink Tide masks an escalating ideological schism within Latin America, where US-aligned governments are actively challenging the anti-imperialist posture. This internal fracture has emerged as a primary obstacle to consolidating regional leadership, and by extension, to the stability and longevity of the Second Pink Tide itself.

Emerging right-wing populists are actively prioritising bilateral cooperation with the US over regional multilateral autonomy, driven by the need for immediate security and economic cooperation. Argentina’s President Javier Milei serves as a prominent example, using his 2025 UNGA address to praise key ally Donald Trump, commending his “restructuring” of the “terms of international trade.” This alignment goes beyond mere discourse, as seen with President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador, who sought to lift a constitutional ban through a referendum allowing the return of US military bases to tackle drug violence. Despite being ultimately voted down, this political trend is increasingly undermining the multilateral dreams of the Pink Tide. 

This ideological battle is compounded by the political vulnerability of the Pink Tide governments themselves. Leaders who champion global justice are struggling to manage immediate domestic issues, particularly debt, economic growth, and organised crime. With Petro struggling with approval ratings of roughly 37 per cent and Chile's Boric popularity crashing, political opponents accuse the use of ambitious international rhetoric of distracting from mounting domestic troubles, leaving the region highly vulnerable to a pendulum swing to the right. The future of inter-American relations thus seems to be defined not by unified defiance, but by this escalating ideological and internal struggle, ultimately representing the existential threat to the Second Pink Tide’s anti-imperialist project.

The Survival of the Project

For the Pink Tide to sustain its international posture, it must strategically refine its approach. They must continue their anti-imperialist discourse by leveraging mechanisms like the ICJ and UNGA, as it remains a powerful tool for projecting moral authority and maintaining solidarity with the Global South. However, their moral authority will be compromised if these governments continue to refuse to condemn autocratic leftist regimes in the region, such as those in Venezuela and Nicaragua.

Ultimately, the Pink Tide's bid for regional leadership is tied to the internal conflict between its diplomatic assertiveness and its silence on regional dictatorships. By moving beyond rhetoric to definitive action on the international stage, they have raised the stakes of this ideological struggle. Yet as their populist opposition adopts its own authoritarian tactics, the region risks democratic erosion on both sides of the political spectrum. Thus, the fight for regional multilateral autonomy is not merely a diplomatic preference; it has become an existential struggle for the very survival of the Pink Tide's anti-imperialist project and, potentially, for democratic stability in Latin America.

Federico Canas Velasco is the Latin American Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. He is completing his final year of a Bachelor of Arts and Advanced Studies in International and Global Studies at the University of Sydney, majoring in Spanish and Latin American Studies.

Born in Australia to Venezuelan parents, Federico's interest in Latin America stems from his proud heritage as well as his academic exploration of the region's cultural, political, and historical complexities. This interest was further enriched when he studied abroad at la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Federico looks forward to this Fellowship as an opportunity to combine his research interests with his personal experience to contribute meaningful analysis on Latin America's future amid shifting global dynamics.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Young Australians in International Affairs. All content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.