Why Australia’s Security Dependence Could Undermine Its Influence

Zachary Hall | Australian Foreign Policy Fellow

Image sourced from Gobierno de Chile via Wikimedia Commons.

Australia historically prided itself on being a middle power, punching above its weight by building bridges. From Bob Hawke’s vision for APEC to sanctions against apartheid South Africa, Australia’s foreign policy posture used to mix great power alliances with strong emphasis on multilateralism and regional outreach. Today, Australia’s tight embrace of AUKUS and United States (US) defence integration risks losing the trait that gives it influence – flexibility.

The opportunity cost of deterrence

For years, political leaders insisted that Australia could have both the US for security, and China for trade. However, as the US-China relationship intensified, Canberra tilted towards the US. This was initially achieved through smaller actions such as strengthening national security requirements for foreign investment, improved defence R&D, and a reinvigorating the Quad security dialogue with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners.

Then came AUKUS: a decision to definitively return Australia’s attentions to traditional anglosphere allies through co-developing nuclear submarines and advanced defence capabilities in cyber and AI. The stated promise of AUKUS is deterrence and interoperability with the US. Yet in practice, this comes with the caveat of deepening Australian dependence on the US – from supply chains and capability requirements of US armed forces to the unpredictability of US politics. Even supporters concede that AUKUS’ large benefits are contingent on large opportunity costs in resourcing and in optics.

Regionally, views are mixed. Upon announcement, Japan and the Philippines welcomed a more capable Australia, while others, including Indonesia and Malaysia, were wary. This underscores the need to rebuild regional trust, particularly with our northern neighbours. It also highlights a trade-off – the more that we tighten traditional defence partnerships, the harder we must work elsewhere to sustain regional trust.

Hedging without balance: Australia’s regional gap

Across the Indo-Pacific, other governments are refining the craft of balance by cooperating with all powers. It is a choreography Australia once performed with ease.

For example, Vietnam partners with the US to deter China but chooses no formal alliances and Chinese dialogue to keep their relationship collaborative. Likewise, India joined the Quad, yet exercises strategic autonomy, buying Russian oil and engages with China through the BRICS forum. Even South Korea, a fellow US treaty ally, hedges through its trade and tech dependence on China. These acts are insurances, ways to spread risk in a region where no single power can or wants to guarantee stability.

The lesson for Australia is not to hedge between Washington and Beijing, but rather to widen its circle of trust. Vietnam, India and South Korea show that strategic autonomy can coexist with close partnerships. By spreading risk across multiple relationships, they gain resilience when one power falters and legitimacy by engaging all sides. Australia by contrast has narrowed its options. Relearning this balance is essential if it hopes to remain an influential middle power rather than a subordinate ally.

This is not to say that Australia’s gravitation toward the US is devoid of geopolitical benefits. The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index places suggest that Australia is second in power through a lens of defence relationships, while only being fifth in overall power. This indicates that alliance strength may come at the cost of flexibility, because integration ties Australia’s choices to the US. Nevertheless, in an increasingly multipolar world, the key to success lies in weaving ties with all. Unless Australia reignites this strategy, it risks being left behind.

Reclaiming the middle-power edge

Australia can reclaim the middle-power edge without abandoning strong security policy. For much of its modern history, Australia relied upon what the late Allan Gyngell called ‘great and powerful friends’ such as the UK and US. Yet much of our influence came from building coalitions with other states, such as the establishment of  the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership alongside Japan. Such flexibility once made Australia a bridge-builder – a role it must revive to regain real influence in the region.

To do so, Australia should frame its foreign policy decisions through expanding its ability to exercise agency rather than entrenching alliances for its own sake. The government’s recent push for deeper economic, particularly investment, ties to Southeast Asia is welcome, but it remains largely rhetorical. Despite high-level commitments, Australia’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia has remained far less substantial than expected, focusing on great power politics with too little focus on concrete investment and trade outcomes.

Reclaiming middle-power influence means shaping the rules once again. Australia helped write the region’s trade architecture. Now, its attention must turn to today’s frontiers of digital, climate, and technology governance. For example, it could lead a coalition on cyber norms, helping ASEAN states strengthen data protection and transparency in AI. Alternatively, it could push for green-supply-chain standards with Japan and Indonesia to demonstrate that climate policy and competitiveness can align. Australia could even champion digital-trade rules surrounding cross-border data flows and associated consumer protections to keep markets open while protecting privacy and intellectual property.

Australia’s challenge is not loyalty versus independence, but alignment versus agency. Security partnerships like AUKUS can strengthen security only if they complement, rather than replace, diplomacy and regional trust with equal vigour. Middle powers earn influence by shaping the rules and connecting others. If Australia can turn its alliances and convening power into tools for collaboration rather than constraint, it can once again be the region’s bridge builder: a proudly Australian public good.

Zachary Hall is the Australian Foreign Policy Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. Zach is a policy officer with a passion for foreign policy’s power to improve lives and strengthen democratic resilience.

Zach has worked across economic, climate, and infrastructure policy in the Australian Public Service, and previously supported trade and diplomatic engagement at the Indonesian and Moroccan foreign missions. He holds a Bachelor of Economics and is currently undertaking a Master of International and Development Economics from the Australian National University.