Between the Queen and the Dragon: Australia’s China Dilemma
- 6 days ago
- 4 min read
Ali Mahmoud
Tucked away in the Southern Hemisphere’s corner of Oceania, Australia occupies a unique geographical position. Anglo-Saxon in culture, the country has been aligned with the Western world since British colonisation and currently has a strategic alliance with the United States (US). To Australia’s North, China has witnessed significant economic growth and military development—the latter causing concern in Canberra. Caught between Chinese trade benefits and cultural alignment with the US, Australia resorts to pragmatism to navigate the two relationships.
Little in Common
The Commonwealth of Australia largely maintained close proximity to the United Kingdom (UK) in the decades after Federation. Australian troops contributed to the Allied Powers war effort in WWI, forming the ANZACs and fighting alongside their British counterparts. However, as the sun of the British Empire set after WWII, Australia required a new protector from its alien surroundings, and found it in the like-minded—liberal, democratic, and former UK colony—the United States of America. This decision reflected both cultural alignment and a persistent perception of strategic vulnerability in its surrounding region.
China is Australia’s largest trading partner, yet the bilateral relationship remains a fluctuating one. After WWII, Mao Zedong ushered in Communist values that opposed Australia’s own. However, Mao’s death marked a critical juncture in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) development, with Deng Xiaoping introducing collective leadership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and cautious economic liberalisation. Despite these reforms, the PRC has continually conceived itself as encompassing a “Sinic Zone” covering East Asia. The liberal world order—anchored by the US and supported by Australia—acts as a constraint on these ambitions, even as China’s growing economic and military power enables the gradual expansion of its strategic influence.
The choice between Washington and Beijing was never a difficult one for Canberra. The US’ Western–Anglo-Saxon culture, its liberal democratic system, and its foreign objectives align well with Australia’s own. This was clear during WWII, when the US came to Australia’s aid against the encroaching Imperial Japanese forces in the South Pacific. It was less a marriage of convenience, or mere pragmatism, but more of an institutionalised natural disposition. Despite excelling trade relations with China in recent decades, Australia has no trouble reaffirming its strategic allegiance to the US. The Canberra Consensus—a bipartisan agreement—commits Australia to supporting American primacy in the Asia-Pacific as a mechanism for regional stability. The matter of supporting the US is paramount to Australia’s strategic culture.
The Changing Chessboard
China’s increased growth has brought about an assertiveness reflected in its foreign policy. The Nine-Dash Line maritime claim, initially declared in 1947 as the sovereign Chinese maritime border, has resurfaced. Moreover, China has built man-made islands in the internationally recognised waters of the South China Sea (SCS), demonstrating a clear reach into a self-determined sphere of influence. In turn, Australia tightened its security and counter-interference laws in the late 2010s, notably banning the Chinese telecom company Huawei from its 5G network. China responded by framing Australia as a US proxy. Despite the prosperity gained from lucrative trade, Canberra now views China’s assertiveness primarily through a single paradigm: threat and competition.
As China’s rise continued through the past decades, the US turned its attention more closely to the Asia-Pacific. The Pivot to Asia policy of the Obama presidency resulted in US troops being deployed in Australia on a rotational basis. This enabled enhanced interoperability between the US and Australian armed forces. Furthermore, Australia, the UK, and the US signed a trilateral security partnership in 2021—AUKUS—which later included providing Australia with nuclear-propelled submarines. Canberra has shored up its defence strategy by firmly taking the role of the Western rook on the chessboard of Oceania. Nevertheless, China remains Australia’s largest trading partner, and Canberra is still dependent on its trade export revenue. While this may seem like a vulnerability, it could equally enhance the odds for dialogue.
A Distinctive Intermediary
Despite US–China relations becoming more competitive, Australia is in a unique position to navigate the tense affiliation between ally and primary trade partner. War between China and the US is avoidable if both nations can craft a common strategic narrative. Canberra could leverage its geographical proximity to Asia to deepen regional engagement while continuing to invest in Western partnerships. By maintaining trade forums with China, Australia could foster dialogue and cooperation, while encouraging the US to adopt a posture of managed competition rather than exclusive primacy.
It is important to note that there are Chinese and Australian academics who are more optimistic on Australia’s relationship with China. Recently, a Lecturer in International Communication from Chongqing University eloquently suggested to me that Australia could be the “water that holds the fish and the rice plant,” instead of a rook on a chessboard. This suggestion highlights the potential of Australia’s position concerning the US and China, geographically, economically, and politically. Though it would be ideal for Australia to fuse the interests of China and the US in a harmonious way, this remains overly optimistic. Nevertheless, positive change starts with positive intentions and posturing.
Canberra must acknowledge its rook status—but mobilise it in a manner that serves its own national interest. To prosper as a middle power is to understand that neither China nor the US will be checkmated.
Ali Mahmoud is a final-year undergraduate student at La Trobe University studying Political Science and International Studies. With a Syrian background, he focuses on Middle Eastern politics, political theory, and China’s civilisational and strategic outlook, and has previously published on ethnic minorities in Syria with the Young Diplomats Society.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Young Australians in International Affairs. AI tools were used by this author for grammar checks or idea refinement, but all content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.