China and Africa: Who is Steering the Ship?

Jemma Tan | China Fellow

UN Photo by Zhao Yun

In a global order impacted by protectionism, China’s announcement of a zero-tariff policy for 53 African nations on May 1^st is an anomaly. All nations covered by the agreement will be allowed to export goods to China without paying custom duties and without the requirement for reciprocal tariff agreements on Chinese imports. It’s another cherry on top of an increasingly warm China-Africa relationship marking 2026 its China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges. 

Ever since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched in 2013 to fill the infrastructure gap throughout the Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe and Africa, this relationship has been subject to intense global scrutiny. Criticisms have been levelled at a perceived lack of transparency, foreign imposition of China’s governance model in Southern Africa and Central Asia, and its construction of an overreliance on Chinese loans, which exceeded the World Bank’s totals between 2000-2020. While China undoubtedly provides essential foreign investment across the continent, Africa’s presence within China is growing rapidly. Just as China's initiatives to win economic alignment and soft power throughout Africa have slowly achieved international recognition, so too are the people-to-people connections and intellectual exchange flowing back, with implications neither government has fully anticipated.

The Foundational Infrastructure

When picturing the contemporary China-Africa relationship, Chinese infrastructure is almost always at the forefront. BRI has sponsored ports, railways, roads and energy gridlines throughout the African continent amid an impressive 151 partner countries receiving USD$1 trillion in investment and construction by 2023. Such infrastructure is legible, visible, and thus over-indexed in coverage that obscures the more nuanced educational or intellectual exchanges, leading Western observers to frame the China-Africa relationship as neocolonial and imperialist. China’s structural presence in Africa and the broader Global South has been consistently referenced as one of China-into-Africa, positing China’s actions as that of a ‘ravenous dragon’ or ‘new colonialists’. Yet these approaches are both at odds with perceptions of China within the Global South, and problematically reflect a deeper Eurocentric bias solely attributing the very neocolonial behaviours to China that Western countries themselves have been accused of conducting since the end of colonial rule. While such framing casting Africa as a passive recipient of leering Chinese interference has been largely debunked by academic research, it increasingly misses the intellectual, cultural and commercial African footprint embedded within China itself.

Influence Goes Both Ways

African influence is now flowing the other way. China became the second largest host of African students in 2023, with a growth of 258% between 2011–2017. Far from passive student communities, African diaspora and professional networks are particularly influential in a homogenous nation like China. Over 200,000 North African traders visit the commodity hub Yiwu annually, reshaping distribution networks and supply chains to embed Africa in the small commodities economy. On an intellectual level, African doctoral and research presence within Chinese universities has led to the formation of robust epistemic communities of independent scholars. These Chinese-trained African professionals are uniquely poised to act as cross-cultural bridges that understand Chinese society, business and governance from a firsthand perspective as opposed to through Western lenses, and simultaneously use such knowledge to advocate for African interests in China-Africa issues. 

African culture is also increasingly present in China. Guangzhou has been dubbed as China’s ‘Little Africa’, with West African restaurants a fundamental feature in its urban centres contributing to a decrease in racial stereotyping or ignorance through such ‘fufu diplomacy’. Where different cultures meet and interact, there further inevitably emerges innovative fusions and intermixing. Fujianese artist Vinida Weng’s music combines both Fuzhou dialect and Afrobeats signalling the wave of support for African culture throughout China’s music industry. Afro-Chinese intermarriages are the most lasting facet of this cultural intermingling. The cumulation of African students, traders and mixed families embedded within China are indeed looking beyond pre-existing roadmaps for diaspora communities in seeking to become societal partners in their own right.

Transactional or Relational?

Whether this cross-cultural exchange can deepen into a relational partnership is at the forefront of the 2026 China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges. Boasting over 600 events including the China-Africa Youth Festival, Youth Innovation and Entrepreneurship Competition, and the China-Africa Youth Space Alliance, it reflects China’s wager that deepening human connections will capture African cultural affinities.

Yet does growing educational and cultural exchange produce China’s desired level of connection? African students offered Chinese scholarships or forum invitations do not return to their respective nations with a uniform view of China, and can still retain media perceptions of the nation. As the African diaspora acquires more influence within the country, each generation is seeking to become accepted as a partner rather than passively absorbing their role within Chinese frameworks. In facilitating a more balanced China-Africa relationship, debt sustainability was challenged by multiple African nations at the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in explicitly "shifting from aid and infrastructure toward a more strategic partnership."

Importantly however, the bidirectional exchange between China-Africa remains contingent on operating within China’s preferred geopolitical architecture. Eswatini was absent from the 53 African nations in the recent zero-tariff agreement as one out of only twelve remaining nations worldwide to diplomatically recognise Taiwan. It is only African countries that retain good relations with China and its positions that may leverage their growing intellectual and commercial presence inside China to negotiate from a stronger position. 

While the China-Africa relationship retains a level of financial and geopolitical asymmetry, the African perspective is no longer peripheral to how the relationship functions. The 2026 People-to-People Year may be China's initiative, but as its African intellectual, commercial and cultural footprint is quietly gaining salience, the long-term winners and losers will not be so easily determined.

Jemma is a 5th year student majoring in Finance and Chinese Studies at the University of Sydney, with an interest in how nurturing international ties can capitalise on the advantages of Australia’s multicultural society. Her connection to China is rooted in her heritage and lifelong appreciation of Chinese language and culture, strengthened during a transformative year abroad at Peking University in Beijing sponsored by the Westpac Asian Exchange Scholarship.

In 2026, she will be working towards an Honours thesis in Chinese Studies centred around exploring Chinese internet language and its impact in social identity formation, working to bridge Australia’s prominent gap in Asia-capability across numerous sectors.

She is excited to contribute to YAIA as a fellow integrating her interests in finance, second language acquisition, economic policy, history and culture into insightful pieces commenting on international interactions with China.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Young Australians in International Affairs. All content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.