China is Reconstructing its Past to Shape the Future

Jemma Tan | China Fellow

Image sourced from Luna Wang via Unsplash

The increase in China’s heritage-led urban reconstructions over the past three decades has emerged as one of the nation’s most salient drivers of cultural tourism. Amid refurbished “ancient” cities, traditional clothing and live performances re-enact China’s imperial past. Yet beneath the veneer of cobblestoned streets, local discontent is rife as communities experience mass displacements and have minimal input into how their heritage is transformed.

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) advances ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’, Xi Jinping’s goal of restoring China to perceived historical prominence as a dominant global civilisation and culture, these anachronistic reconstructions reveal a structural tradeoff. Since 2012, the Party has propagated narratives underpinning “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture”, one of the President’s political doctrines, calling for strengthening Chinese culture’s international appeal and domestic zixin, a state-promoted sense of cultural pride. Heritage reconstruction has become an architectural answer to this ideological call. At the sacrifice of genuine conservation, the CCP imposes a unified national identity while consolidating state control over historical memory.

The National Cultural Heritage Administration (NCHA)’s fourth survey on immovable cultural relics ongoing after a twelve-year gap now presents an opportunity to integrate community voices into reconstructions. Yet CCP policymakers persist in framing cultural heritage as a state asset rather than community resource. Across gentrification, ethnic homogenisation and the guochao consumer trend, the pattern is undeniable. Reconstruction imposes identity from above while destructive human consequences are absorbed from below.

Constructive Destruction

The human cost of China’s heritage reconstructions is most evident through forced displacements and cultural erasure that accompany such projects. Shanghai’s Xintiandi district exemplifies this phenomenon. Once surrounded by historic neighbourhoods, it now functions as a nostalgia factory of faux-imperial Qing Dynasty architecture, cafes and restaurants. While not as visibly destructive as earlier transformations, it reveals a key detriment of heritage-led reconstruction: tourism-driven gentrification is pricing out locals to shape heritage into a consumable experience. 

These reconstructions were not always enacted with consumption in mind. In the 1990s, sweeping urban reforms demolished old settlements to bolster high-rise developments. Beijing’s hutong neighbourhoods, once the city’s ‘cultural heart’, were reduced to just 10 per cent of the 7000-8000 original buildings.  By the early 2000s however, China’s 37 UNESCO World Heritage designations ignited a shift from pure demolition to cultural reconstruction. Infamously, the reconstruction of Datong in Shanxi province stands as an extreme example, whereby Mayor Geng Yanbo’s heritage tourism vision purged 70,000 residents and erected Ming Dynasty walls that erased the city’s Northern Wei Dynasty heritage. 

This mutating pattern of manufactured history, which Shanghai Tongji University professor Ruan Yisan titles ‘constructive destruction’, underscores a critical misalignment. At a time where spiking cultural interest from citizens is driving annual increases of 18% for domestic tourism trips, these destructive outcomes stem from a heritage governance model that restricts communities from determining how their past is represented.

Cultural Confidence: Rebuilding for State Narrative

This restriction on community input reflects a reconstruction model designed to advance ideology rather than authentically preserve heritage. Under Xi Jinping, reconstructions have evolved to serve as conduits of CCP narratives underscoring a unified Chinese civilisation. Through visual propaganda emphasising China's “more than 5,000 years of heritage”, the Party aims to legitimise their revisionisms while projecting a singular national identity.

This ideological dimension privileges top-down control over authentic engagement with local cultures. Once sites are identified, the NCHA assumes a centralised authority to determine their renovations. The redevelopment of Lijiang’s Old Town in 2011 reflects this; diverse Dongba, Naxi, Bai, Tibetan and Han cultures were assimilated into a homogenised image of ‘national harmony’. These constructions function as staged spectacles, projecting CCP narratives of social unity through architectural manipulation.

Notably absent from these reconstructions are any avenues for communities to voice their image of cultural heritage.  World Bank initiatives in Guizhou province demonstrated that participatory approaches can succeed with proper support. Yet, centralised logic persists even under recent reforms. While increasing fines for damage and mandating pre-archaeological assessments, the NCHA’s 2025 revision excludes reference of reconstructions and community consultation, exacerbating a growing vulnerability as the CCP simultaneously encourages bottom-up cultural consumerism.

Heritage Becomes Marketable: Politics, Pride and Pop Culture Intersect

Excluding community voices ironically contradicts their growing promotion of popular cultural engagement. Heritage reconstruction now spurs top-down cultural confidence through channels of bottom-up consumerism like cultural tourism and zixin. Young people in particular have embraced zixin through guochao or ‘China chic’. Hanfu fashion shoots and vlog influencers have exploded across digital platforms, populating screens with images that align with the Party’s vision of a culturally uniform future China.

Video games, television and films like Black Myth: Wukong and Ne Zha 2 that centre the past glory of Chinese mythology and history have also driven heritage site pilgrimages. The CCP reciprocates such bottom-up drivers that align with its cultural vision of a standardised national identity, most notably by expanding transport infrastructure to guide tourism where reconstructions are rife. Yet as Chinese tourists increasingly choose to travel domestically, disappointment with mismatches between airbrushed scenic towns and their staged realities is widespread. This growing gap between curated spectacles and real heritage explicitly threatens the legitimacy of reconstruction projects.

Xi Jinping Thought on Culture’s central contradiction, the promotion of cultural confidence while denying communities control over their heritage, reveals the unsustainability of the CCP’s model. Despite legislative changes, China’s heritage reconstructions reward state narrative and entertainment over authenticity. If the CCP wishes to sustain its narrative of rejuvenation, this framework must embed local input and limit top-down reconstruction. Otherwise, the Party risks rebuilding a fabricated past disconnected from its people, undermining the political legitimacy these projects were designed to uphold. 

Jenna is a 4th year student majoring in Finance and Chinese Studies at the University of Sydney, with an interest in how nurturing international ties can capitalise on the advantages of Australia’s multicultural society. Her connection to China is rooted in my heritage and lifelong appreciation of Chinese language and culture, strengthened during a transformative year abroad at Peking University in Beijing sponsored by the Westpac Asian Exchange Scholarship.

In 2026, she will be working towards an Honours thesis in Chinese Studies centred around exploring the impact of Mandarin-English translation in cross-cultural interactions, working to bridge Australia’s prominent gap in Asia-capability across numerous sectors.

She is excited to contribute to YAIA as a fellow integrating her interests in finance, second language acquisition, economic policy, history and culture into insightful pieces commenting on international interactions with China.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Young Australians in International Affairs. No AI tools were used by this author