From Rising Seas to Rising Tensions: Integrating Climate and Defence in the Indo-Pacific

Michaela Rana and Faran Rana |

Image sourced from Marc Coenen via Pexels.

Climate change is increasingly recognised as a threat multiplier that exacerbates existing geopolitical tensions, security and defence challenges across the Indo-Pacific. To preserve its regional credibility and influence as a middle power, Australia could further integrate climate into its defence and climate agendas. One key opportunity is to weave climate-security into the nation’s core security policy and defence posturing, particularly within AUKUS Pillar II. Doing so will demonstrate credibility as a reliable security and climate partner to Southeast Asian and Pacific nation states.  

As extreme weather events grow more frequent and severe, they compound instability, drive humanitarian crises, and stretch the capabilities of Australian defence forces, domestic, and broader regional security. Cyclone Alfred and the Queensland floods underscored Australia’s domestic vulnerabilities to climate shocks, while similar events in the broader Indo-Pacific region reaffirmed it as one of the most climate-vulnerable region globally — from recent earthquakes and weather disruptions in Southeast Asian states like Thailand and Myanmar, to rising sea levels threatening the very existence of both larger countries such as Indonesia, and smaller Pacific Island nations, particularly Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands. Drought conditions are also worsening across Australia, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and large parts of Southeast Asia, increasing food and water insecurity, driving internal displacement, and fuelling dissatisfaction with government responses. 

Resource competition — particularly over fisheries, freshwater, and minerals — is also intensifying in climate-affected maritime zones, leading to a rise in illegal fishing and organized maritime crime and straining already overstretched maritime enforcement efforts and often drawing in the Department of Defence for additional operational support. These cascading impacts generate potential flashpoints for conflict and heighten the demand for humanitarian assistance and climate support. 

Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update has already identified the rising need for climate-related responses across the Pacific and Southeast Asia (especially South Pacific), showing that climate change cannot be treated as a separate issue from national security and defence policies. Investment of AUD$75 billion into the ADF’s maritime capabilities over this decade may have helped enhance climate response efforts. Similarly, beyond the maritime domain, more than 600 ADF members assisted the relief effort in Vanuatu following Tropical Cyclones Kevin and Judy in early 2023. Meanwhile, the shifting geopolitical landscape, marked by US backpedalling on climate under the new administration, has created a leadership vacuum that Australia is increasingly expected to fill, particularly as concerns heighten around the reliability of the new US administration as an ally and a global climate leader.  

Australia’s credibility and influence in the region will depend on its ability to lead by example. Pacific nations increasingly demand stronger action on climate, both in terms of reducing its own emissions and providing support e.g. climate finance. Fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) account for 91 per cent of Australia’s primary energy mix in 2023-24, and the country is the of the largest coal and gas exporters. Addressing this reliance is not just prudent from a climate perspective, it is strategically essential for maintaining the trust in Australia across the broader Indo-Pacific region. Australia can also leverage its position to spotlight the challenges facing Pacific nations, however, Pacific nations strongly expressed their disappointment when Australia pulled out the bid to co-host COP31, which many saw as an opportunity to put Pacific priorities at the centre of climate negotiations. 

Going forward, as great power competition and climate change intersect, Australia can reinforce regional alliances and remain a trusted and effective middle power in the Indo‑Pacific, while also enhancing security. To that end, Australia can systematically weave its climate‑security priorities into its defence and security architecture, starting with AUKUS Pillar II, developing further climate-focused advanced capabilities. This would allow AUKUS partners to jointly build resilience, support humanitarian operations, and enhance infrastructure in vulnerable nations, while also reinforcing strategic presence and genuine continued collaboration and partnership. 

Australia’s leadership in helping the region decarbonise and navigate these challenges will not only foster economic and environmental stability but also reinforce Australia’s credibility and influence as a regional power, which is essential to maintain strategic partnerships and counter growing geopolitical risks. Such an initiative would also help relieve the mounting strain on Australia’s disaster response capabilities, ensuring more sustainable regional engagement and cementing a permanent foothold for leadership across the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Some may argue that the inclusion of a climate component within AUKUS Pillar II, given its narrow focus on advancing technology and capability development, may distract from its core defence objectives, potentially weakening consensus amongst AUKUS members and stray from its original strategic purpose of deterrence. However, these additional measures for environmental resilience will encourage military-to-military disaster preparedness, creating even stronger ties and operating as a clear signal to other Indo-Pacific nations.

Michaela Rana is a counter-terrorism early career researcher, program and policy specialist. Michaela’s expertise focuses on countering violent extremism in fragile states, law enforcement, rehabilitation, and deradicalisation efforts. She brings extensive experience from the Australian Government, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and other international organizations.

Faran Rana is an energy and climate finance professional focusing on how countries and institutions plan, fund, and deliver the energy transition, particularly in emerging and developing economies. His experience spans international organisations, including the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and previously the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views of these organisations.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Young Australians in International Affairs. All content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.