Gulf’s Shift in Power: Kuwait’s Failing Parliament

Hafsa Arslan | Middle East Fellow

Image sourced from Sohrab Zia via Unsplash.

The “oasis of democracy” has dried into ruin, with its future hanging in uncertainty. For decades, Kuwait has been one of the most democratic states in the Middle East, being the only Gulf monarchy with an elected parliament. This semi-democracy allowed for the representation of citizens' interests, demonstrating to the world that the Gulf was not solely composed of authoritarian states and that liberalism can coexist with hereditary monarchy.

However, this liberal outlier has now collapsed with the suspension of Kuwait’s parliament in 2024, marking the state’s transition into the Gulf’s regional authoritarian framework. Kuwait’s democratic backsliding reveals the true reality of governance in the Gulf today: the lack of clarity in hybrid systems cannot withstand the pressure of regional authoritarianism.

Kuwait’s constitutional ambiguity has paralysed its national representation, causing it to rely on executive control for institutional clarity. If meaningful political participation is to be preserved, Kuwait must clarify and rebalance its constitutional powers. Otherwise, Kuwait will remain beholden to the Gulf’s dominant authoritarian centralised model.

Kuwait’s paralysis by design

Kuwait’s constitution, unamended since 1962, has created a political tug-of-war between the ruling Sheiks and the common folk. Its hybrid system includes the Emir as the hereditary monarch, and the National Assembly that can impeach ministers. The parliament was deemed inefficient due to allegations of corruption and gridlock, and in May 2024, it was suspended for a four-year period, pending a constitutional amendment to determine the continuation or cessation of a hybrid system. With the Emir ruling by decree, it seems likely that this will result in autocracy spreading to Kuwait.

Kuwait’s democracy didn’t fail because the hybrid structure was unfavourable; it failed because a clear distribution of decision-making power was never determined. Political representation that results in a blockade damages public institutions and makes executive-dominant rule a desirable alternative.

Regional models of power

Although Kuwait’s dissolution was catapulted by its instability, it occurred at a time when Gulf Cooperation Council states sought to implement rapid economic reform in a drive for modernisation. Economically lagging behind, Kuwait’s Emir dissolved the parliament, signalling a shift away from liberalism towards a more authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, implemented through a centralised decision-making power, has allowed for rapid economic shifts with minimal legislative friction.

Similarly, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has centralised its economy through technocratic authoritarianism without parliamentary obstruction. The stark contrast of Kuwait’s hybrid system with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi impelled Kuwait’s Emir gain favour with the successful governments of the latter to pursue economic development.

The Emir’s dissolution of parliament was swiftly welcomed by the Gulf states, who long viewed Kuwait’s democratic scheme with reservations due to its divergence from the their vision of political governance. Kuwait’s internal crisis has thus been further inflamed by its neighbours’ external reinforcement of the Emir’s executive authority. With regional actors supporting the Emir, Kuwaiti citizens have grown distant from their government, reinforcing the lack of domestic trust in political representation.

Lack of legitimacy for citizens

The erosion of Kuwaiti citizens’ rights is at the heart of its hybrid decline. For decades, its citizens had embraced the Kuwaiti parliament as a source of pride, as it gave them a voice denied to other Gulf citizens. However, repeated parliamentary dysfunction has stripped such pride to its bones. The mass revocation of 40,000 nationalities in recent years, justified as a sovereign prerogative, lacks judicial oversight and has significantly targeted women who gained citizenship through marriage. This signals that rights and citizenship are conditional and can be revoked, undermining the state’s political legitimacy.

Similar practices are mirrored across the Gulf region. Bahrain has recently revoked 31 citizenships as a tool to silence political dissent, leaving people stateless and disproportionately targeting its Shia majority. Likewise, Saudi citizens increasingly view Vision 2030 as a bargained compromise that deepens inequality.

Amid this regional context, Kuwaiti citizens are losing faith in political representation, whilst simultaneously fearing the state’s discretionary powers. Ultimately, this trend and the absence of constitutional clarity have had a corrosive effect on Kuwait’s hybrid model. The lack of citizen safeguarding highlights the fragility and lack of constraints on executive power, reflecting the broader Gulf trend of placing limitations on political participation under the appearance of reform.

Regional implications

Kuwait’s fragile hybrid system has paralysed its representation, eroding its legitimacy in the region. Constitutional clarification must be prioritised to define the limits of executive suspension and strengthen the judicial oversight of citizenship revocations.

Incentivising short-term stability with rapid economic reforms results in the strengthening of centralised power, but also significantly narrows political diversity and representation in the region. Kuwait’s experience serves as a cautionary tale of an authoritarian shift, spotlighting the broader tensions between human rights, governance, and public accountability. As Kuwait seeks durable reform through constitutional clarity, legal institutions and civic avenues should be interwoven into the parliamentary structure to ensure democracy and a shift away from technocratic authoritarianism.

Kuwait’s parliamentary suspension highlights the importance of defining limits in hybrid governing models to function effectively. The absence of such clarity has paralysed Kuwait’s participatory institutions, resulting in regionally supported executive consolidation. If Kuwait wants to remain the most democratic state in the Gulf, it must swiftly reinforce its constitutional boundaries to protect the legitimacy of its democratic framework and prevent further erosion of citizens’ trust.

Hafsa Arslan is the Middle East Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. She is a final-year Curtin University student, pursuing a Bachelor of Commerce (Honours) in Economics and a Post-graduate Diploma in International Security. She is a two-time New Colombo Plan scholar, having completed an internship in South Korea in early 2025 and a study tour in Japan, focusing on the intersection of economic and geopolitical dynamics in the Asia-Pacific.

With her lived experience across the Indo-Pacific, particularly the Middle East, Hafsa has developed a strong interest in the region’s political and cultural landscape, exploring its complexity separate from its mainstream identity. Through this fellowship, she has combined her passion for cultural nuance and equity-driven policy discourse to create diverse perspectives for the region.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Young Australians in International Affairs. All content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.