The EU’s Push to Remove Migrants: A Sign of Europe’s Power Imbalance?

Lejla Cavcic | Europe and Eurasia Fellow

Image sourced from Gerd Altmann via Pixabay.

The European Union’s (EU) recent albeit failed proposal to send migrants to third countries reflects a growing power imbalance between wealthier member states and poorer non-EU countries. As far-right politics and anti-migration sentiment gain traction, the burden of managing migration is increasingly shifted onto countries with fewer resources and less power.  

In March 2025, the European Commission proposed a new law for the creation of ‘return hubs’ for migrants. Led by countries such as Germany, France and Italy, it sought to implement the hubs in non-EU ‘safe third countries’ (STCs), to manage migrants with rejected asylum applications. Despite this, Europe remains one of the world’s largest hosts to migrants, hosting 82.3 million in 2019, more than any continent that year.

The proposal was an attempt to offload migration responsibilities as rooted in international human rights law and the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, including the right to seek asylum, protection from refoulment, and fair and humane treatment. For example, these changes could increase separation of families and individuals sent to unfamiliar countries.

Not only is the STC approach an unsustainable solution, as it fails to address root causes of displacement, but it also reinforces power imbalances between EU and non-EU countries, particularly impacting the Balkans.

Offloading responsibility, not solving crisis

Politicised migration deals deepen economic uncertainty for host countries and prolong migrant instability, evidenced by bilateral agreements between non-EU states, Denmark and Kosovo, and EU members, Italy and Albania. Italy made a controversial deal with Albania to set up camps in Albania to hold male migrants for periods of up to four weeks. After two prior attempts failed due to legal challenges, leaving migrants in limbo for months, Italy’s third attempt saw 49 migrants sent to Albanian military base camps to be held while their applications are processed.

This agreement exemplifies the EU’s focus on outsourcing migration management to non-EU countries to sidestep legal responsibilities and domestic political pressures, emphasising control over compassion. Italy has attempted to appeal to domestic audiences and align with the EU’s emerging stances on migration management at the expense of migrant rights and third-country stability.

Deals such as these not only prolong the uncertainty for migrants but offer little real support to economically struggling host countries. Denmark’s 210 million euro deal to house 300 prisoners in Kosovo, one of Europe’s poorest countries, sparked criticism that only politicians would benefit in a nation where 23 per cent live in poverty. Detaining migrants in poorer, non-EU countries delays their ability to work, settle, or reunite with their families while placing long-term strain on the country’s limited resources, offering little in return beyond short-term political favour or financial aid. 

Return hubs deepen power imbalances by allowing wealthier EU countries to outsource migration control to poorer nations already struggling to manage migration, shifting responsibility while avoiding accountability. This approach strips migrants of their agency, sometimes splitting up families, and undermines international human rights protections, reinforcing unequal power dynamics between states and individuals. 

This demonstrates the reach and magnitude of EU power beyond sovereign borders. The Schengen state of Croatia already has four return hubs on its borders, pushing migrants back into bordering non-EU states Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Human rights activists argue that this is another example of the EU’s “obsession with deportations”, preferred over social inclusion and regularisation.

EU’s rightward shift shaping migration sentiment

Far right parties, typically anti-migration and in favour of closing borders, use the immigration agenda to push for the externalisation of migration management. Being a central issue for far-right groups, migration fuels agendas rooted in national identity, economic pressure, and security concerns.

In 2024, Europe experienced a shift to the right in elections and national polls across EU countries such as Italy, France and Germany driven largely by stances on migration. In response, the EU has pursued legislation establishing return hubs. While migration flows remain steady to Europe, they are increasingly politicised by the far-right who mobilise fear over fact. As the EU moves further toward the far right, non-EU countries face direct consequences.

Anti-migration sentiment is not limited to Europe’s right. In 2022, former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell of the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party, described Europe as a “garden” and the rest of the world as a “jungle”, stating that no wall is “high enough to protect” it. This highlighted persisting Eurocentric views on global relations within the Commission, hinting that European powers view themselves as responsible for protecting the perceived quality of life in Europe from outsiders. This rhetoric, along with the implementation of return hubs, may become a way in which Europe securitises its borders, without regard for the way it affects the lives of migrants.

The increased efforts by the EU to offload its migration responsibilities do not merely come from disinterest. It is a deliberate strategy by wealthier states to shift the burden onto poorer, non-EU countries. Fuelled by far-right pressure, this approach deepens existing inequalities under the guise of effective migrant control, leaving migrants in prolonged uncertainty. Instead of addressing the root causes of migration, the EU risks creating a system that priorities political convenience over human rights. A more sustainable approach requires shared responsibility, a focus on migrant wellbeing and long-term regional stability.

Lejla Cavcic is the Europe and Eurasia Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. Lejla holds a Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Arts from the University of Adelaide, majoring in Politics and International Relations. Her passion for Europe and Eurasia is influenced by her Bosnian heritage. She is fluent in Bosnian, having earned two Awards of Excellence in the language during her senior school years. As the Europe and Eurasia Fellow, Lejla is excited to leverage her knowledge to contribute to discussions on international affairs, human rights, and their implications for the region.