Too Many Cooks Spoil the Treaty
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Mikey Glover | Climate and Environment Fellow
United Nations (UN) multilateral treaty-making has historically been the gold standard for legitimate, inclusive international climate governance. Leveraging universal participation and consensus-based decision-making, it balances States’ sovereignty over their natural resources with the need for collective action to address transnational environmental challenges. In January 2026, the “Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement” (BBNJ) reached the 60-ratification threshold and entered into force as the first legally binding global framework for marine life sustainability in international waters. It addresses the regulation lacuna on depletion of the high seas, which account for almost two-thirds of our ocean. And yet in August 2025, the resumed fifth negotiations session for a “Global Plastics Treaty” (GPT) collapsed again, with a finalised framework far from completion. Given the threat of plastic pollution, why does protection for the high seas succeed where regulating plastics does not? The treaty development process is exposed to States’ political economy, undermining resolve to pursue ambitious environmental policy perceived as being contrary to short-term political and economic interests. With powerful non-State actors and geopolitics provoking protectionism, multilateral treaty-making is increasingly insufficient as the principal form of international climate governance.
The Influence of Political Economy
Agreement in UN multilateral treaty-making is contingent upon achieving tacit “consensus” when no State formally objects, requiring alignment of each State’s own interests with collective environmental goals. While the BBNJ required almost 20 years of negotiation, it capitalised on the mutual gain of protecting the world’s largest global commons. Averting a race to the bottom where overexploitation collapses shared ocean ecosystems aligned biodiversity and environmental concerns with geoeconomic interests, such as for marine research and resources. Importantly, the BBNJ includes all five countries responsible for 90 per cent of this “distant-water fishing”–China (and Taiwan), Japan, Korea, and Spain. For these countries, participation and environmental diplomacy grants inside leverage to shape regulations and geopolitical influence. While the BBNJ attracted some criticism for making certain compromises, such as lacking robust enforcement measures for information and technology sharing, it is considered a historic victory in ocean protection.
Conversely, governments are incentivised to block regulation that exposes them to economic or political risk, especially that which compromises powerful vested interests. Plastic pollution harms across collective, national, and local levels; the plastics industry accounts for 3.4 per cent of GHG emissions, and the ~80% of plastic produced now pollutes our oceans, terrestrial ecosystems, and our own bodies. And yet, despite agreement for the GPT to regulate downstream waste management and reduce single-use plastics, upstream production remains an intractable issue. A small “like-minded” group of the major plastic and oil-producers–including Saudi Arabia, the US, and Russia–oppose the majority-supported cap for production of virgin plastics and controls on production chemicals. Over 99 per cent of plastics are derived from fossil fuel chemicals–one of the only remaining growing markets. Faced with the impact of controlling plastic production on local fossil fuel and petrochemical industries, and the record number of lobbyists attending the negotiations, these counties prioritise their political and economic vested interests above environmental needs. This has only been exacerbated by a new geopolitical environment marked by high perceived distributional conflict, where countries are increasingly viewing ambitious environmental commitments with suspicion about free-riders and undermining their competitive advantage. The optimism of the 1990s “Decade of International Law”–with rapid proliferation of international treaties and trade liberalisation–is at odds with protectionist policies of influential economies seeking to derisk supply chains and strengthen domestic industries. As such, the plastic-producing States continue to oppose consensus to force a deadlock, or to drag ambitious policy to a lowest-common-denominator “toothless tiger” with vague commitments and little enforcement power.
So, What Now?
UN multilateral treaty-making is the archetypal form of coordinated international climate governance. It reflects that global challenges do not respect national borders, and the BBNJ demonstrates that a focus on mutual gain and majority voting can deliver. However, States are increasingly beholden to the influence of political economy, seeking to protect the vested interests of powerful non-government actors and preserve competitive advantage in a tense geostrategic climate. Continued failure to resolve the GPT is concerning, and hardline positions appear to leave no pathway toward consensus. Most participants support a treaty covering the entire plastic lifecycle, including the European Union and recently China–the world’s largest plastic producer, seemingly pursuing the environmental leadership vacuum left by the US. Hence, there is support to allow majority voting, similar to the BBNJ, or to create a “break-away treaty” amongst a willing coalition outside of the UN. A broadly supported, independent treaty could pressure luddite States to unify their regulations to ensure access to international markets. But, the speed of coalition models lack the inclusiveness and legitimacy of universal UN processes, and risk marginalising the voices of smaller States. Market-based mechanisms that aim to internalise the costs of plastic pollution, such as through taxing non-compliant plastics or building circular economy infrastructure, also offer alternate pathways to action, however, may reinforce market inequalities.
Governments are expected to return to GPT negotiations later this year under a new chair, yet there is scepticism about the value of further dialogue. Where treaty-making requires subordinating short-term economic and political interests–of the nation or its industries–to shared environmental objectives, negotiations contingent on universal consensus risk agreements that are either too weak or never even concluded. Willing participants must cooperate to pursue alternative pathways that produce fit-for-purpose, ambitious international environment law. Legitimacy is important, but legitimacy without delivery is not governance. Against the backdrop of global environmental challenges, it is effective international governance and collective action that we need.
Mikey is a recent graduate of the University of Sydney with a Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor ofScience. He has a strong interest in climate governance, international environmental law, andAustralia’s role in shaping cooperative responses to transnational environmental challenges.
His academic work has focused on international environmental frameworks, including plastics regulation, water governance, and global climate litigation. As a research assistant with theAustralian Centre for Climate and Environmental Law, he investigated how legal and non-legal mechanisms can protect and restore natural ecosystems.
Mikey also studied in Shanghai at the East China University of Political Science and Law, deepening his interest in China’s climate transition and the implications for Australia–China environmental cooperation.
Through this fellowship, Mikey hopes to further explore how environmental diplomacy and governance can support a resilient, sustainable, and equitable Asia-Pacific.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Young Australians in International Affairs. All content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.