India Keeps Its Options Open at the SCO

Mirielle Augustin | Indo Pacific Fellow

Image sourced from President of Russia via Wikimedia Commons.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, Narendra Modi’s warmer-than-usual gestures with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin looked like a potential shift in diplomatic alignment. Some outlets framed it that way, portraying India as edging closer to China and Russia at the expense of its Western partnerships. But this reading misses the point. The summit was not a reset with China or a break with the United States (US). It was India’s strategic autonomy in action: keeping multiple doors ajar, pocketing selective gains, and keeping security issues at arm’s length. In a season of tariff shocks and oil politics with the US, India reminded global audiences that it cannot be boxed in by any one partner.

The SCO Summit

The summit offered India a stage to demonstrate its balancing act in practice. The SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and international security group comprised of 10 countries. Established in 2001, it has become an increasingly important forum for security and economic cooperation. The 2025 summit was the SCO’s largest gathering yet, with talk of new cooperation tracks, and momentum toward a SCO Development Bank. For India, the stage offered a venue to engage China and Russia on terms that are not US-centred, handy given Trump’s increasingly transactional policy approach. Modi’s exchanges with Xi struck a softer tone, highlighting trade, travel, and people-to-people links, while deliberately steering clear of unresolved security disputes.

Timing added weight to these gestures. Just days earlier, the US imposed fresh tariffs on Indian imports and stepped up its criticism of discounted Russian oil purchases. For India, the SCO was a way to show that such pressure would not dictate its choices. By practically engaging with China and Russia, India signalled it could widen its options even as it deepened cooperation with Western partners elsewhere. The maintenance of flexibility under pressure while keeping core security positions intact is a hallmark of India’s strategic autonomy.

India’s Approach to Major Powers at the SCO

India’s diplomacy at the SCO mirrors its broader approach to major powers: cooperate selectively, resist pressure, and preserve autonomy. With China, the SCO meeting signalled dialogue without trust. Border militarisation and distrust persist even after disengagement at some friction points, while China’s close partnership with Pakistan constrains any genuine thaw. India’s simultaneous deepening of Quad exercises and high-altitude training underscore that the nation’s security calculus remains unchanged. Further, these choices show how India can maintain limited cooperation with China while keeping its security independence intact.

Russia was another important piece of the picture. Modi’s carefully staged warmth with Vladimir Putin, the car ride, “dear friend” language, and reaffirmed “special and privileged” partnership, signalled continuity and showed that India would not disown a decades-long relationship under third-country pressure. Since 2022, India has scaled up purchases of discounted Russian crude on affordability grounds, and that policy is unlikely to reverse soon. Reassuring Russia not only preserves defence-industrial access but also hedges against future oil supply shocks, reinforcing India’s preference for flexibility.

The US, meanwhile, remains a central partner in defence and technology, even as tariff hikes and criticism over Russian oil have added friction. None of this displaces India–US cooperation; it simply underscores why India prefers issue-based alignment over bloc discipline when partners introduce volatility.

Throughout the SCO summit, India’s ability to turn external demands into bargaining power was on full display. By engaging China narrowly, reassuring Russia, and balancing the United States, India resisted being boxed in, preserving its freedom of action as the cornerstone of its statecraft.

What the SCO Means for the Region

India’s behaviour at the SCO summit carries important implications for the Indo-Pacific. The summit showed that while India is willing to ease frictions with China in narrow areas such as trade or travel, its deeper commitments remain with partners like the US, Japan, and Australia. These coalitions will continue to expand in defence cooperation, maritime awareness, and supply-chain resilience–the practical work that builds deterrence and long-term stability.

However, India will not close the door on China completely. If flights resume, market access opens slightly, or trade facilitation picks up, it will be because such steps can be kept separate from sensitive issues like sovereignty and the border.

This balancing act also serves as a message. By pushing back against US tariffs, India underscores its independence; by reaffirming ties with Russia, it protects legacy partnerships; and by engaging China on limited terms, it reinforces that India cannot be isolated. Together, these moves show India’s regional strategy clearly: cooperation works best when it accommodates autonomy, not when it demands strict alignment.

Strategic Autonomy in the Indo-Pacific

The SCO summit did not redraw Asia’s map; it reaffirmed India’s map of its own interests. Strategic autonomy to diversify ties, compartmentalise disputes, and turn pressure into bargaining power is the through-line connecting Modi’s exchanges with Xi and Putin to India’s ongoing work with the US and its partners. In a more transactional global moment, keeping options open is not equivocation; it is statecraft calibrated to a contested Indo-Pacific.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Young Australians in International Affairs. AI tools were used by this author for grammar checks and idea refinement, but all content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.

Mirielle Augustin is the Indo Pacific Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs. She is completing a Bachelor of Philosophy (Honours)-Humanities and Social Sciences and a Diploma of Languages at the Australian National University. Of East Timorese and Malaysian heritage, she grew up across France, Mauritania, Cameroon, Timor-Leste and Australia, which has shaped her passion for public policy, cultural diplomacy, and multilingual engagement.

Mirielle has studied and worked abroad in France and Indonesia, including programs supported by DFAT’s New Colombo Plan, and the Australia-Indonesia Youth Exchange Program in 2024. Through this Fellowship, she hopes to explore how international affairs can better reflect the lived realities of Indigenous and marginalised communities.